is a very poor model of judges' decision making, and should be rejected. Even if the model 28 were accepted, the ideal points do not represent positions in the political space, but rather 29 judges' attitudes towards dissent. Consequently, it is mistaken to call judges 'airy fairy 30 libertarians', ministerial comments notwithstanding. 31 WHY MIGHT JUDGES JUDGE POLITICALLY? 32 There is an extensive literature on the politics of the judiciary. We know that, definitionally, 33 courts are political institutions, 7 that they have important consequences for the rest of the 34 political system 8 and that judges can play important non-judicial roles in public life. 9 My focus 35 is narrower. When I describe judges as being political, or talk of judges judging politically, 36 I mean that they make decisions on the basis of 'political' beliefs: specifically, that when judges 37 decide how to dispose of a case -typically whether to allow or dismiss an appeal -their 38 decisions are a function of the location of that case and that judge in some political space, such 39 that judges who are far apart in that political space will be less likely to agree on the 40 disposition of a case. This definition encompasses both 'attitudinal' 10 and 'strategic' 11 41 accounts of political judging, but excludes analyses that try to explain the decisions of panels 42 of judges or infer judges' positions from the decisions of panels they have sat on. 12 43 There are both general and particular reasons for believing that judges are political in 44 this sense. Generally, judges in comparable courts have been shown to be political. Of the 45 seven common law courts of last resort in large, consolidated democracies, analysis of 46 judges' ideal points has been undertaken in four courts: the US and Canadian Supreme 47 The particular reason for believing that we can locate judges in the political space is that In the model of judicial decision making that I use, unanimous decisions provide no information about the relative or absolute positions of the judges. While it is true that panels of judges may unanimously give decisions that seem to be particularly left wing or right wing, it does not necessarily follow that the judges who decided those cases were particularly left wing or right wing. Non-unanimous cases, by contrast, allow us to identify differences between justices that may reflect attitudes towards public policy. 22 Disagreements over rationes may be informative about judges' politics, but are not relevant to the analysis I present here. 23 Table 1 , the discrimination parameters can be modelled as follows: In that case, the area-specific intercept will be close to zero and the parameter attached to 205 the case outcome will not only be very large, but if the recovered dimension runs from 206 'left' to 'right', will also be strongly negative. If, by contrast, family law cases do not on 31 This model in no way constrains cases of a certain directionality to discriminate with respect to the recovered dimension: the credible intervals surrounding the coefficients g 1k are extremely large and encompass zero. 32 Bridge and Griffiths were chosen because they lay at opposite ends of Robertson's 1998 'constitutionalism' dimension, with Bridge more likely to find in favour of appellants alleging infringement of their civil rights. 33 Values of Geweke's diagnostic were within the range 61.96 for all but two judges. Trace plots are available on request. had a negative discrimination parameter, and they were all cases that lacked a clear direction.
242
Whether our recovered dimension runs from left to right or right to left, this finding implies 243 that one side of the court was permanently in the majority, whilst the other side was 244 permanently condemned to fruitless dissent. Such an interpretation is difficult to sustain, 245 given the rough parity between 'liberal' and 'conservative' outcomes shown in Table 1 .
246
The coefficients predicting these discrimination parameters also performed poorly.
247
Although four out of five coefficients had the right sign, the coefficient was significantly This interpretation is strengthened by considering the known politics of these judges.
259
Suppose we describe a judge as 'conservative' if he has contested a seat for the Figure 3a) . judge has the same probability of voting with the majority. Therefore, the judge locations based on the draft opinions of their colleagues, 45 and will 'acquiesce or give a dubitante 333 opinion' in order to preserve unanimity. 46 Judges are also less likely to reverse colleagues 334 with whom they will have to work in the near future. 47 Such behaviour violates the 335 assumption of conditional independence that is found both in attitudinal models of 336 judging and in the item response framework. Methods that treat the majority outcome as 337 the explanandum, such as linear discriminant analysis 48 or ecological item response 338 theory, 49 may therefore yield intelligible judge and case locations.
